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2The end of history lasted for such a short time. If the early 1990s
raised hopes of a broad based consensus on economic policy for
growth, equity and poverty reduction, the late 1990s dashed them.
The East Asian crisis and the Seattle debacle saw to that. In the year
2000, the Governors of the World Bank, whose mission it is to
eradicate poverty, could meet only under police protection, besieged
by those who believe instead that the institution and the policies it
espouses cause poverty. And the street demonstrations in Prague,
Seattle and Washington, D.C., are one end of a spectrum of
disagreement, which includes vigorous debate in the pages of the
leading newspapers, passionate involvement of faith based
organizations, and the genteel cut and thrust of academic discourse.
The last two years have seen my involvement in an extensive
process of consultation on poverty reduction strategies.1 The
consultation reached out to most interested constituencies in the
academic, policy making and advocacy communities. It covered the
IFIs and the myriad UN specialized agencies, Government Ministries
in the North and the South, Northern aid agencies, academic analysts
in rich and poor countries, Northern and Southern advocacy NGOs,
and NGO’s with ground level operations working with the poor. It
involved a global electronic consultation, as well as conventional
written contributions, and scores of meetings. A particularly valuable
exercise was the systematic attempt to elicit directly the “Voices of
the Poor” through participatory assessments.
This paper presents an analysis of the broad themes of
disagreement in these consultations and more generally among those
concerned with poverty reduction. It has to be noted first of all that
there are swathes of agreement in areas where there would not have
been consensus two decades ago. Any discussion of disagreements
has to start with an acknowledgement of these areas of agreement.
But, clearly, there are deep divisions on economic policy, distribution
and poverty. These divisions spilled out in the consultations, mostly
                                                  
1 Most of this consultation was under the auspices of the World Bank’s World Development Report
on Poverty, of which I was Director until I resigned in May, 2000.
3politely but sometimes in vehement discourse, written and oral,
harbingers of the street battles to come.
The paper tries to answer an obvious question: How can people
with seemingly the same ends disagree so much about means, and
how can seemingly the same objective reality be interpreted so
differently? The simple answer, which the protagonists themselves
often provide, is of course to question the motives or the analytical
capacity of those ones disagrees with. The suggestion that “the
others” are either not truly interested in attacking poverty (quite the
opposite, in fact), or that they make elementary errors of fact or
interpretation, is never very far below the surface.
However, it is argued here that at least some of the disagreement
can be understood in terms of differences in perspective and
framework. Understanding disagreements in these terms— rather than
in terms of motives or intelligence— is more conducive to
encouraging dialogue rather than confrontation. The object of this
paper is to provide an account of some of the underlying reasons for
deep disagreements on economic policy, distribution and poverty, and
to couch these in an analytical rather than a rhetorical frame. But
before doing this we need to say a little more about disagreements
over what and disagreements between whom.
1. Disagreements Over What and Between Whom?
Disagreements over what? The next section will review some
broad areas of consensus on poverty reduction strategies. But the
focus of this paper is on disagreements, and these have begun to
coalesce around a seemingly irreduceable core of economic policy
instruments. There are major disagreements on the pace and
sequencing of fiscal adjustment, monetary and interest rate policy,
exchange rate regimes, trade and openness, internal and external
financial liberalization including deregulation of capital flows, the
scale and methods of large scale privatization of state owned
enterprises, etc. Perhaps trade and openness is the archetypal,
4emblematic, area around which there are deep divisions, and where
certainly the rhetoric is fiercest.
Disagreements between whom? Any attempt at categorization and
classification risks doing violence to a complex and richly textured
reality. But the following grouping would be recognizable to many,
and captures broad elements of policy disagreements. One group, call
them Group A, could be labelled “Finance Ministry”. In this group
would obviously be some who worked in finance ministries in the
North, and in the South. It would also include many economic
analysts, economic policy managers and operational managers in the
IFI’s and the Regional Multilateral Banks. A key constituent would be
the financial press, particularly in the North but also in the South.
Finally, one would include many, though not all, academic
economists trained in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Another group, call
them Group B, could be labelled “Civil Society”. This group would
obviously include analysts and advocates in the full range of
advocacy and operational NGO’s. There would also be people who
worked in some of the UN specialized agencies, in aid ministries in
the North and social sector ministries in the South. Amongst
academics, non-economists would tend to fall into this group.
To repeat, any such classification is bound to be too simple a
reflection of reality. There are clearly people who work in the IFIs
who are not “Finance Ministry types”, just as there are academic
economists trained in the Anglo-Saxon tradition who would, for
example, caution strongly on capital account liberalization. The U.N
specialized agencies and Northern aid agencies are often a battle
ground between Finance Ministry and Civil Society tendencies. And,
as the next section makes clear, some NGO positions on specific
policies would be approved of in Finance Ministries, and vice versa.
This being said, however, the proposed grouping offers a sharp
enough, and recognizable enough, characterization of divisions to
help us understand the nature of disagreements. Group A types are
those who tend to believe that the cause of poverty reduction is best
served by more rapid adjustment to fiscal imbalances, rapid
5adjustment to lower inflation and external deficits and the use of high
interest rates to achieve these ends, internal and external financial
sector liberalization, deregulation of capital controls, deep and rapid
privatization of state owned enterprises and, perhaps the strongest
unifying factor in this group— rapid and major opening up of an
economy to trade and foreign direct investment. On each of these
issues, group B types tend to lean the other way.
The real question we face is why? Why is it that these two groups
disagree so much across key areas of economic policy? The basic
contention of this paper is that much of the reason lies in differences
in perspective and framework on three key features characterizing
assessments of the consequences of economic policy for distribution
and poverty: Aggregation, Time Horizon, and Market Structure. First,
Group A tends to view the consequences of economic policy in much
more aggregative terms than does Group B. Second, Group B’s major
concerns are with consequences over a time horizon which is both
much shorter and much longer than the “medium term “ horizon
which Group A typically adopts. Third, Group A instinctively
approaches the distributional consequences of economic policy
through a competitive market structure, while Group B instinctively
thinks of a world in which market structure is characterized by
pockets of market power, and economic policy feeds through this
non-competitive structure to the consequences for the poor.
The elaboration of Aggregation, Time Horizon and Market
Structure, as providing a framework for understanding deep
disagreements on economic policy, distribution and poverty, is the
core task of this paper. But before elaborating on disagreement, let us
consider areas of agreement.
2. Some Areas of Agreement
The consultations revealed wide areas of agreement--some old,
some new, and some surprising.
6There is no question that there is now broad agreement on
education and health outcomes being on par with income in assessing
poverty and the consequences of economic policy. This is now so
commonplace that it is easy to forget that it was not always the case,
that twenty-five years ago great intellectual and policy battles were
fought in the World Bank on broadening the conception of
development and poverty reduction. Perhaps today’s new proposals
on conceptualizing poverty— for example, that empowerment and
participation should in their turn be treated on par with education and
health and income— will equally become tomorrow’s foundations.
Another area in which the consultations revealed considerable
agreement, at least at a certain level of generality, was on the role of
international public goods in determining the well being of the poor.
Whether couched in terms of cross border spillovers of environmental
externalities or financial instability, or in terms of the central role of
basic research into tropical agriculture and tropical diseases, the
recognition was clearly abroad that public intervention is needed in
these areas. The emerging importance of this issue was instinctively
grasped by most. It may well be that this happy state of affairs is due
precisely to the fact that this is a relatively new issue in the policy
arena, that once we get into the details, divisions will grow. Thus, for
example, while there was overall broad support for the idea of a
Vaccine Purchase Fund to bridge the gap between the costs of basic
research and the purchasing power of the poorest nations, there was
already some dissent on such funds being unwarranted subsidies to
corporations, who should instead be directed to supply drugs they
already have at prices the poorest can afford.
A third area where there is a surprising amount of agreement, or
more accurately not as much disagreement as there was twenty or
even ten years ago, is on the old “Markets versus State” debate. There
has definitely been some coming together on this. Particularly
interesting were the positions of NGO’s with actual ground level
operations working directly with poor. In the consultations, these
organizations tended to be very pragmatic. The question for them was
always what worked to improve the standard of living of the people
7they were helping, not about ideologies favoring state over market or
the other way round.
Consider, for example, the work and philosophy of SEWA, the Self
Employed Women’s Association, which operates in Gujarat State in
India.2 SEWA grew out of the long history of organizing textile
workers in Ahmedabad, but applied and modified those lessons to
organizing women in the informal sector. Starting from an urban base,
it has now also expanded to organizing in rural areas (
http://www.sewa.org). SEWA’s ground level campaigns, and their
national advocacy work, reflects a pragmatism which eschews
ideological positions on “state versus market”. They have supported
certain types of trade liberalization because they increase the demand
for the output and labor of their members. But they have opposed
other types of trade liberalization when they hurt, for example, the
employment and incomes of the husbands and brothers and fathers of
their members. They are strong supporters of deregulating the control
of the Gujarat State Forestry Commission on the livelihoods of their
members. But they oppose deregulation of the pharmaceutical
industry because of the devastating impact of these on basic drug
prices, and they support increased regulation in Export Processing
Zones to ensure that labor standards are met. Is SEWA pro-state or
pro-market? It is difficult to say. What is clear is that SEWA is pro-
poor. One of their best known pamphlets is in fact entitled
“Liberalizing for the Poor.”
The more one moves away from ground level operations, the more
one moves to advocacy groups of any shade, pragmatism gives way to
more defined a priori positions on state and market. But even here, the
divides are not as great as they were at the height of the cold war, or
at the zenith of post cold war triumphalism which heralded the “end
of history”. At the turn of the century the real questions are to do with
the right balance of market and state, and how things actually work on
the ground.
                                                  
2 In July 1999 I was involved in an immersion exercise organized by SEWA and the German Institute
for North-South Dialogue. Officials from aid agencies and parliaments were taken by SEWA to stay
for a few days with and experience the lives of the women SEWA works for and with.
8Alongside this lessened divide on markets versus state, there is
broad agreement on the central importance of institutions in
regulating markets, in regulating government, in determining the
interaction between households in the market place, and thus in
determining the outcomes for the poor. One of the striking findings
from the Voices of the Poor exercise was how important institutions
like the police and the courts were to the reality of poor people’s
lives. At the macro level, the role of institutions in determining the
investment climate was also agreed upon in the consultations. Of
course, once again, this was at a certain level of generality. When
detailed discussions started, and especially when they impinged on
economic policies, divisions tended to appear.
So there is broad consensus in some areas and at a certain level of
discourse, to set against the divisions that are the focus of this paper.
But these very agreements throw into sharp relief the disagreements
that remain. It is almost as if the battle is more intense because it is
now focused more sharply on fewer and fewer remaining issues. Let
us turn now to the nature of these disagreements.
3. The Nature of Disagreements I: Aggregation
In the current discourse on economic policy, distribution and
poverty, there is a strong sense of people talking past each other, each
side equally convinced that it has the truth, even when confronted
with seemingly the same objective reality. How can that be? One key
factor is that different people instinctively operate at different levels
of aggregation when they talk about outcomes, or about the
consequences of different economic policy interventions. This goes
beyond the simple point about GDP versus poverty or other
distribution indicators, which is the usual way in which this divide is
portrayed. Many in Group A now work with poverty measures which
calculate, for example, the fraction of people in a country who fall
below a critical level of income or expenditure— the most commonly
used threshold is the famous $1 per person per day poverty line. Even
with something like this measure, the two groups have very different
9perspectives on poverty outcomes. Some of the differences are
obvious, others less so.
The following personal experience illustrates the reaction that
many analysts in Group A get when they present their formal poverty
analysis to broader audiences. After doing detailed academic work on
the Ghana Living Standards Survey in the 1980s and early 1990s, in
1992 I found myself as the head of the World Bank’s Field Office in
Ghana. My academic work, and that of others, had shown clearly that
the incidence of poverty in Ghana, defined as above but with a local
poverty line, fell between 1987 and 1991. The exact magnitude varied
depending on the detailed calculations, but there was a three or four
percentage point decline over these four years. This was pitifully
small, but it was actually very good by African standards.
The analysis presented, in common with the best practice in this
area, had made all the necessary adjustments and corrections to
overcome the shortcomings of these sorts of data. For example,
considerable effort was put into correcting for regional price
variations, making imputations for dwellings, correcting for
household size, etc., in  arriving at the poverty measure. But when the
analysis was presented in Ghana, very few people believed it. From
academics in the Universities, through foreign and local NGO’s, to
the trade unions and the Rotary Clubs— there was an astonishing
degree of disbelief. And this is not an uncommon reaction, at least in
Africa, to such analysis which shows poverty decreasing. The natural
reactions of Group A analysts to this disbelief usually go through the
whole gamut— that people do not really understand the detailed
statistical analysis, that those who criticize represent special interest
groups, that some people will never admit that they are better off, etc.3
But before dismissing disbelief in this way, it is as well to consider
that there might be legitimate reasons for this response,
understandable even within the standard framework of household
survey based analysis.
                                                  
3 I include myself among those who have had such reactions.
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There at least three reasons why the claim that poverty had gone
down in Ghana, for example, could be questioned. The first of these is
well recognized by household survey analysts. The income-
expenditure based measurement of well being has improved a lot over
the years— for example, production for home consumption is now
routinely included, capturing of regional price variation is getting
better, and imputing use value to dwellings is also becoming standard.
However, one thing that these measures do not capture very well, or
at all, is the value of public services. There are separate modules in
these surveys with questions on education and health and
infrastructure and so on, but these are rarely, almost never, integrated
into the income/expenditure measure of well being because of
conceptual and data difficulties. And it is this income/expenditure
measure that is used in calculating the headline poverty ratios.
So, it is quite possible for public services to worsen considerably
and yet for this effect to not show up in the income-expenditure based
measures of poverty incidence. If the bus service that takes a woman
from her village to her sister’s village is cancelled, it will not show up
in these measures. If the health post in the slum runs out of drugs, it
will not show up. If the primary school text books disappear, or if the
teacher does not turn up to teach, it will not show up. But those with
ground level operations and personnel will pick these up. And to
them, as well as to the poor, the claim that poverty has gone down
will ring hollow. None of this is to say that it is not useful to calculate
nationally representative, household survey based, income-
expenditure poverty measures. It is simply to say that focusing on
them solely misses out on desegregated detail which others can help
to fill in, and which influences the perceptions and assessments of
these others.
The second reason for the disconnect one often finds between
household survey based poverty measures used by Group A and the
perceptions of Group B is that of regional or group desegregation.
Even accepting the income-expenditure based measures to be an
accurate representation of wellbeing, quite often a national fall in the
poverty incidence can be composed of large movements in opposite
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directions. For example, in Ghana, between 1987 and 1991, the fall in
national poverty was composed of a fall in rural areas  and a rise in
urban areas. In Mexico between 1990 and 1994, the fall in national
poverty was composed of a fall in urban areas, but an increase in
some rural regions. It is important to realize that we are not talking
here about the odd household or two getting worse off. The poverty
index for entire regions increased. While the fall in the national
poverty index, and the falls in those regions which are driving this fall
at the national level, are clearly to be welcomed, just focusing on the
aggregate picture is liable to miss out the increasing poverty in Accra,
the capital of Ghana, or in the Chiapas region of Mexico. And for an
NGO working with street children in Accra, or for a local official
coping with increased poverty among indigenous peoples in Chiapas,
it is cold comfort to be told, “but national poverty has gone down.” A
similar story can be told about gender based desegregation, and other
groupings based on ethnicity and race.
It should be clear that in the above type of disconnect neither view
is “wrong”. Different parts of the same objective reality are being
seen and magnified. It is both true that the national poverty incidence
has declined, and that major groups have been made worse off. The
problem is that instead of attempting to understand the other
perspective each side hunkers down to defend its view in increasingly
strident terms. Group A analysts just keep repeating that poverty has
gone down, and do not make any concessions to the complex group
specific patterns, while Group B analysts and advocates become
increasingly irritated and alienated from a discourse which does not
match the reality they know.
Consider now a third and not frequently appreciated disconnect
related to aggregation. The work horse poverty concept of Group A
analysts is the incidence of poverty— the percentage of the total
population below some poverty line, say one dollar per person per
day. This is the concept they instinctively go for. For example, the
leading International Development Target, broadly accepted by donor
agencies, is to halve by 2015 the incidence of poverty. But analysts
and especially advocates and operational types in Group B
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instinctively think of the absolute numbers of poor as the criterion.
The potential for disconnect should be clear. In Ghana, for example,
while the incidence of poverty was falling at around one percentage
point per year between 1987 to 1991, the total population was
growing at almost twice that rate, with the result that the absolute
number of poor, even using the standard income-expenditure based
measure, grew sizeably.
Think again of the local NGO with ground level operations. If the
number of people turning up to soup kitchens, the number of
homeless indigents who have to be provided shelters, the number of
street children, increases, those who work in these organizations are,
quite rightly from their perspective, going to argue that poverty has
gone up. That the incidence of poverty has fallen is of little relevance
to them, and to be told repeatedly and insistently that poverty has
fallen is bound to lead to difficulties in communication and dialogue.
One sees this also at the global level. The World Bank’s figures show
that over the 1990s the absolute numbers of the poor stayed roughly
constant at around 1.2 billion. The incidence of poverty has fallen
since world population is on the increase. Has global poverty fallen or
stayed the same? One challenge often heard in the consultations was:
“How can you say economic growth helps the poor? Look, there has
been all this growth in the 1990s, and yet the total number of poor has
not changed at all!” Leaving to one side the growth issue, to which a
whole section is devoted later in the paper, it is easy to see how
communication can be derailed by different groups meaning different
things by the same word— poverty. In this case a good start would be
clarity and comprehension, but even that might not help because the
issue of whether the criterion is the incidence of poverty or the
absolute numbers of the poor is still left open.
Thus, instinctive adoption of different levels of aggregation in
describing and evaluating the distributional and poverty consequences
of economic policies explain at least some of the disconnect one
observes. The above arguments and characterizations would all be
present for each of the economic policies in dispute –for example, the
impact of trade policy reform on distribution and poverty.
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Understanding these differences is the first step in more fruitful
dialogue between those who primarily rely on national poverty
incidence measures derived from household surveys to assess the
evolution of poverty, and those who have a much more finely
disaggregated view of the outcomes of economic policy.
Unfortunately, at the moment the lack of mutual comprehension is
leading to polarization, with Group A often retreating into the formal
technical bunker, and simply repeating their findings without trying to
understand what Group B is trying to say, and Group B dismissing
Group A analysis as either out of touch with reality or, even worse,
actively manipulated to get certain answers. Neither of these positions
is healthy, and bridging the aggregation divide is essential if we are to
move forward.
4. The Nature of Disagreements II: Time Horizon
Implicit or explicit differences in the time horizon over which the
consequences of policy are assessed explain some of the deep
disagreements on economic policy, distribution and poverty.
The “medium term” is the instinctive time horizon that Group A
uses when thinking about the consequences of trade policy, for
example. This is implicit in the equilibrium theory which underlies
much of the reasoning behind the impact of policy on growth and
distribution. It is also implicit in the way empirical analysts interpret
their cross-country econometric relationships between growth, equity
or poverty on one side and measures of openness on the other— the
time period over which the effect of change in the right hand side
variable is assumed to impact on the left hand variable. There is of
course no simple way to link the short or medium or long term of
economic theory and modelling to actual calendar time. But by and
large when Group A talks about the consequences of policies for
distribution and growth they have in mind a five to ten year time
horizon.
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But Group B has concerns that are both more short term and more
long term. Those who work with the daily reality of poor people’s
lives, are extremely concerned, like the poor themselves, about short
term consequences of economic policy which can drive a family into
starvation, or lead it to sell its assets at fire sale prices, or to pull its
children out of school. For them it is no use to be told that over a five
to ten year horizon things will pick up again. In fact, it is not even
good enough to be told that in the medium term things will be better
than they would have been without the shock of this policy change
because without the policy change things were in decline anyway. All
this is true, but short run survival trumps medium run benefits every
time, if the family is actually on the edge of survival. As Keynes
might have said, in the short run they could all be dead.
Increasingly, Group A accepts the issue of short-term vulnerability
and shocks as being an important one, not only because it affects well
being in the short term, but because behavioral responses to this
vulnerability may themselves lead to inefficiencies which affect the
prospects for growth and poverty reduction in the medium term. And
the issue of safety nets is back on the table, after its banishment in the
1980s, the banishment itself being a reaction to their inefficiencies
and misuse in the 1960s and 1970s. However, safety nets are
sometimes thought of by Group A as being an add on, to address the
negative short term consequences of trade opening, for example. They
tend to be cautious about them as a systematic part of an insurance
and redistribution mechanism, and they certainly would not want to
see trade opening to be halted or slowed down because these safety
nets and compensation mechanisms, however temporary, were not in
place. This last point is central, and an acid test. In the absence of
safety nets, Group B would be cautious or downright hostile to trade
openness. Group A would want to press ahead, often dismissing those
who argue for caution as either not understanding that openness
would actually lead to greater equity and poverty reduction, or as
special interest groups with protection on their minds. Not facing up
to the implicit difference in time horizon accounts for at least some of
the vehement disagreements on this score.
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There are also those who have what they see as a much longer time
horizon than a decade. Environmental groups, including some with
religious perspectives on stewardship of the earth’s resources, fall into
this category. For them, it is the fifty or the hundred-year perspective
that is important. They do not see how economic growth can be
sustained given limits on the earth’s carrying capacity, and they see
immediate and long term negative consequences of resource
depletion. An important corollary of this line of thinking is that
implicit or explicit redistribution from rich nations to poor nations
will have to substitute for economic growth as the foundation for
global poverty reduction. Group A are essentially techno-optimists.
They refer back to the gloomy scenarios painted by the Club of Rome
in the 1970s and point out, quite rightly, that none of these came to be
true. While there are clearly some market distortions which lead to an
inefficiently high level of resource depletion, and cross border
spillover effects which lead to their own coordination problems, their
answer is to fix these distortions rather than forcibly hold down
investment and growth. In any event, they do not see it as a politically
feasible option over the five to ten year horizon to ask the rich
countries to undertake massive redistribution in favor of the poor
countries, and they have a strong sense that technological change will
come to the rescue over a fifty or hundred-year horizon, as it always
has in the past.
In the consultations, therefore, Group A was fending off both
shorter term and longer term perspectives. But the real point is that
oftentimes it was not clear that it was this difference in perspective,
rather than the specifics of trade policy or privatization policy or
whatever, which was driving the difference. Clarity is not resolution,
but it is a start.
5. The Nature of Disagreements III: Market Structure and Power
Undoubtedly the most potent difference in framework and
perspective centers on market structure and power. The implicit
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framework of Group A in thinking through the consequences of
economic policy on distribution and poverty is that of a competitive
market structure of a large number of small agents interacting without
market power over each other. The instinctive picture that Group B
has of market structure is one riddled with market power wielded by
agents in the large and in the small. This is true whether they are
talking about the power of big corporations in the market place or in
negotiating with governments, or of the power of the local
moneylender in determining usurious rates of interest in the village
economy. They see the formulation and implementation of economic
policy as being influenced by agents with market power, and they see
policy feeding through to consequences through a market structure
which is not competitive.
The immediate response of Group A to the suggestion that
openness in trade, for example, might hurt the poor in poor countries
is to (implicitly or explicitly) invoke the basic theorems of trade
theory. Opening up an economy to trade will benefit the more
abundant factor because this factor will be relatively cheap and
opening up will increase demand for this factor overall. Since
unskilled labor is the factor abundant in poor countries, opening up
will benefit unskilled labor and hence the poor. Leaving aside the fact
that this is a theory of medium term equilibrium, and thus subject to
the disagreements discussed in the previous section, it is also a theory
based on competitive product and factor markets. In particular, if
local product and factor markets are segmented, because of poor
infrastructure or because of the local monopoly power of middlemen
and moneylenders, the simple theory will not go through quite so
simply. But it is precisely such situations (as well as the disaggregated
and the short term consequences discussed earlier) that are
highlighted repeatedly in discussions about the possible negative
consequences of openness. The tendency among Group A is to
dismiss these claims, and to revert again to stating the conclusion that
openness is good for equity.
Another example is capital mobility. Leaving to one side the
question of portfolio capital, where Group A has itself moved to a
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more cautious stance since the financial crises of the late 1990s, there
is the issue of mobility of investment capital. A very strong belief in
Group B that came across in the consultations was that increased
mobility of investment capital makes workers in both receiving and
sending countries worse off. Such a view was derided by Group A
analysts as being incoherent— “How can you say that when capital
leaves the US it hurts US workers, and when it gets to Mexico it hurts
Mexican workers as well?!”
Of course in a framework with perfectly competitive markets, it is
indeed incoherent to suggest that increased capital mobility makes
workers worse off everywhere. At most it will make workers in only
one country worse off. Moreover, since with capital mobility capital
will move to the highest return, this is more efficient so the gainers
could more than afford to compensate the loser, if such a mechanism
existed. But now consider the following set up. Capital and labor
markets are not perfectly competitive. Rather, capital and labor
bargain in each country over wages and employment. Now consider
making capital mobile. It can be seen that this is akin to increasing the
bargaining power of capital relative to labor, so that increasing capital
mobility, whatever its effects on efficiency, could end up making
workers in both countries worse off relative to capital. This is the
implicit framework Group B used over and again in the consultations,
with added emphasis on the political power of big multinational
corporations to influence economic policy on such issues as capital
controls or regulation of Foreign Direct Investment. The answer of
Group A was to reply with the findings of the (implicit or explicit)
competitive framework, and cycle of non-dialogue would go on from
there.
The above are examples from trade and openness, but the same
divide is present in discussions of the consequences of other
economic policies such as privatization of state owned enterprises.
The implicit framework of those supporting rapid and large scale
privatization is one where state monopoly is replaced by a
competitive structure of firms without monopoly power. The implicit
framework of those more cautious in this regard is one of a state
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monopoly, which might be at least somewhat responsive to the needs
of consumer through political pressure, being replaced by a private
monopoly with no such restraints.
The point of the above discussion is to highlight differences in
basic frameworks used instinctively in thinking through the
distributional and poverty consequences of economic policies. Of
course many in Group A are aware of how non-competitive elements
can affect their predictions (for example, trade theory has made great
strides in recent years in incorporating elements of monopolistic
competition), but in policy discourse it seems as though Group A has
by and large plumped for the competitive market structure
framework. But thinking through the distributional consequences of
economic policies when market structures are not competitive, in the
small or in the large, will be needed before the framework of Group A
can be made to speak to the concerns of Group B. For example,
whether the capital-labor bargaining framework discussed above is
valid is an empirical question that can be tested for different countries
and industries. But until such models are worked out commensurately
with the now standard competitive framework models, there can be no
basis for comparison and assessment. And until that is done, it will be
a stand-off between two very different perspectives on market power.
6. A Seeming Disagreement: The “Growth” Red Herring
The word “growth” was immediately divisive in the consultations,
with Group A accusing Group B of being “anti-growth”, and Group B
characterizing Group A as holding the view that “growth is
everything.” In fact, there is more agreement here than meets the eye,
and the rhetoric of both groups stands in the way of seeing the degree
of agreement that does exist.
Unfortunately, the word “growth” is used in both in its technical
sense of “an increase in real national per capita income,” and also to
connote a particular policy package, disagreements over key elements
of which has been the focus of this paper. This package is “growth
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oriented policies” as seen by Group A and “economic policies which
hurt the poor” as seen by Group B. If used in the technical sense, one
would probably find less disagreement on whether growth so defined
could help poverty reduction. Or rather, the discussion could then
focus on economic policies and on Aggregation, Time Horizon and
Market Structure as discussed in this paper, which is where the true
nature of disagreements is to be found.
Consider the claim by some that others are “anti-growth”, usually
followed by empirical demonstrations that growth (increase in real per
national per capita income) is strongly correlated across countries and
over time with reductions in national level measures of income
poverty. There is no question that these correlations are very strong
indeed. But that is not the point. In all of the consultations over the
two years, not one person from Group B in Eastern Europe, for
example, claimed that the disastrous increase poverty and worsening
of social indicators in Eastern Europe in the 1990s had nothing to do
with the precipitous decline in real national per capita income during
this period. Nobody made the even more absurd claim that had the
decline in per capita income been even greater, the poor would have
somehow been better. The claim that they did make, however, was
that the policy package that the transition economies were advised (or
forced) to adopt was what led to the decline in per capita income and
to the increase in poverty.
As another example, not one person from Group B in East Asia
claimed that the tremendous improvement in poverty and social
indicators in East Asia, over the thirty years prior to 1997, had
nothing to do with the fact that per capita income in these countries
multiplied several fold over this period. Nobody made the even more
absurd claim that the position of the poor would have been better had
this growth been negative. But what they did claim was that the policy
package put in place by these countries over these years differed in
key elements from the policy package currently being recommended
by the IFI’s and some Northern Finance Ministries. Finally, coming to
1997, not one person from Group B in East Asia claimed that the
sharp increases in poverty registered in East Asia during the crisis had
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nothing to do with the fact that per capita income collapsed. They did
not make the even more absurd claim that had the per capita income
decline been greater, the poor would have been better off. What they
did claim was that the policy package these countries were
encouraged to adopt in the mid 1990s, especially rapid capital account
and financial sector liberalizations, caused the crisis and the attendant
decline in per capita income and the increase in poverty.
To characterize these positions of Group B as claims that growth
does not help the poor, and to then refute them by showing the
undoubted negative correlation between per capita income and
poverty, not only misses the point--it does the debate a disservice as
well. The real debate to be engaged is on the policy package and the
consequences of different elements of it for distribution and poverty.
Correlations between per capita income and poverty are beside the
point because the real dispute is about the consequences of alternative
policies.
Now in fact, in written and oral contributions from Group B in the
consultations, very often one would indeed find statements of the type
“growth is not the answer to poverty” or “the IFI’s are obsessed with
growth as the answer to poverty.” But an effort must be made to
understand what the true meaning of such statements is, from their
context and from extended dialogue. Statements such as the ones
above captured intent much better if “growth” were replaced by
something like “Washington consensus policies” or “the standard IFI
package.” It might be argued that one should take the words for what
they are, but one also finds very often that Group A uses “growth” as
shorthand for “growth oriented policies” by which they would mean a
certain type of policy package, the contents of which we have been
discussing. If Group A slips into this usage, it is understandable that
in responding, Group B does the same. Thus part of the problem is
that the word “growth” is used to mean both an increase in per capita
income, and to refer to a policy package, and this is true of Group A
and Group B.
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None of the above is to minimize in any way the deep
disagreements that do exist on Aggregation, Time Horizon and
Market Structure. Even with growth defined as increase in per capita
income, Section 5 has already discussed how some in Group B argue
that this is not the answer over a fifty or a hundred year time horizon.
Also, Section 4 discussed how any given increase in per capita
income could be associated with myriad desegregated patterns of
distributional and poverty change, even when national poverty falls.
But the vehemence of the “growth” debate, on both sides, is
somewhat misplaced if by growth one means simply an increase in
real national per capita income. The current growth debate, certainly
as presented by some elements of Group A, misses the point, and
derails dialogue on the real issues of poverty reduction strategies.
7. On Policy Messaging: Negotiation versus Dialogue
Faced with such deep divisions based on legitimate differences in
perspective and framework, what should one do? The answer is
clearly to develop dialogue based on an attempt at mutual
understanding of the different frameworks, how they can lead to
different interpretations and conclusions, what sort of evidence might
help to resolve some of the differences, and to come out with
measured and nuanced positions. Unfortunately, quite the opposite
seems to be happening. Over the past few years, the divide has grown
and a polarization has set in. For the IFI’s, the siege of their biannual
meetings is proving a traumatic experience. More generally, Seattle
both symbolized and crystallized the vehemence of the disagreements.
The stance everywhere is one of confrontation and negotiation, rather
than understanding and dialogue.
My focus here is on Group A, especially when it presents policy
messages that synthesize analytical work. Here again, a negotiating
stance seems to be in play, especially among some parts of the IFI’s
and the G7 Treasuries. Even when, intellectually and analytically,
Group A accepts the complications, qualifications and nuances
brought about by considerations of desegregation, differences in time
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horizon, and non-competitive market structures, the tendency is for
the policy messaging— for example on trade and openness-- to be
sharp and hard, for fear that to do otherwise would be read as a sign of
weakness by “the other side”. Especially since Seattle, a “line in the
sand”, “this far, no further,” mentality seems to have gripped elements
of Group A— in the IFI’s, in the G7 Treasuries, in the Financial Press
and some in academia. “Give them an inch of nuance and they’ll take
a mile of protection” is the mindset. Paradoxically, the growing areas
of agreement noted at the outset— for example on education and
health, and on institutions— tend to lead to a sharper stance being
taken on the remaining areas of dispute on core economic policies.
This is unfortunate. At least twice before, elements of Group A
have taken such a hard stance, with a negotiating mindset, and both
times have had to retreat after considerable conflict which negatively
affected the prospects for future dialogue. The first example of this is
capital account convertibility, on which the IFI’s, with the broad
support of G7 Treasuries, took a bold stand in the early and mid
1990s, and dismissed those who were sceptical of the benefits and
fearful of the consequences. Since the 1997 crisis the tune has
changed, but the earlier intransigence did not help the dialogue when
the need for a nuanced position was finally recognized.
The second example is debt relief for the poorest countries. Prior to
1995 the IFI’s, again with broad backing from many G7 Treasuries,
stood very firm against debt relief. The policy messaging of the time
was sharp and hard, for fear that any opening would be the “thin end
of the wedge” through which large scale debt write downs would
break open the IFI’s. In 1995, the policy messaging changed and
indeed began to call for debt relief4. It is hard to believe that analysis
and evidence suddenly revealed the truth in 1995. Rather, the G7
Treasuries and the IFI’s recognized political pressure from the
growing global coalition for debt relief. But the negotiating stance
adopted before 1995 sowed seeds of mutual suspicion that affect the
                                                  
4 As the World Bank’s Chief Economist for Africa, in 1995/96 I was a member of the joint World Bank/IMF
Task Force which put together the first proposal for debt relief to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).
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dialogue on debt relief today, even under very different
circumstances.
There is a second strand of argument in play on the simplicity or
complexity of policy messages, this time directed at the IFI’s and Aid
agencies by some elements of Group A, particularly some in the
Financial Press and in the G7 Treasuries. This is that these agencies
should keep their policy messages simple, for fear that any
complications and nuances will lead them into ever more complicated
activities. Keeping their messages simple, in this view, will save the
aid agencies from themselves, or at least from their tendency to take
on a broader and broader development agenda. This point is made in
the context of economic policies, but also in fear that the agreement
on the importance of institutions, for example, may lead Aid agencies
to intervene where they cannot and should not.
Some clear thinking is needed here. It is perfectly coherent to hold
simultaneously the view that the consequences of economic policy for
distribution and poverty are complex and nuanced, and that aid
agencies and donors cannot and should not attempt too complex a set
of interventions in developing countries. Indeed, there is an argument
to be made for outside intervention to be highly cautious precisely
because of the complexity of the situation on the ground. This is
certainly true of institutional reform, but it is also true of economic
policy. What is problematic, however, is to present a falsely simple
view of the world in the policy messaging emerging from aid agency
analysis, as a device to restrain complex and unproductive
expansionism by aid agencies. The latter problem must be faced on its
own terms, and must not be allowed to influence the synthesis of
analysis.
If the world is complex, or if the evidence is uncertain, or if
legitimate differences in perspective and framework explain
differences in conclusions, analysis must take these on board. And the
policy messaging that comes from such analysis must reflect the
nature of those complexities. Inappropriate simplifying and hardening
of policy messages, either as a way of constraining the operations of
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an aid agency, or as a negotiating device because of the fear that
nuancing will be seen as a sign of weakness in policy debate, will
only serve to polarize the debate further and will not be conducive to
broad based dialogue.
8. Conclusion
When the institution whose self-stated mission it is to eradicate
poverty can only hold its Annual Meetings under siege from those
who believe its mission is to further the cause of the rich and
powerful, there is clearly a gap to be bridged. And the gap is not just
between the IFI’s and their critics. There is a growing divide on key
areas of economic policy, even as agreement broadens in other areas.
Indeed, the conflict over economic policy gets more intense as the
areas of disagreement shrink to what seem to be an irreduceable core.
This paper has argued that underlying the seemingly intractable
differences are key differences of perspective and framework on
Aggregation, Time Horizon and Market Structure. Simply
recognizing and understanding the underlying nature of the
disagreements in these terms would be one step in bridging the gap.
But more is needed. More is needed from both sides, but my focus
here is on Group A. For those at the more academic end of that
spectrum, the message is that explicitly taking into account these
complications is more likely to shift the intellectual frontier than
falling back yet again on conventional analysis5. For those at the more
operational and policy end of the spectrum, especially those in policy
making and policy implementing institutions, the message is that
recognizing and trying to understand legitimate alternative views on
economic policy, being open and nuanced in messages rather than
being closed and hard, is not only good analytics, it is good politics as
well.
                                                  
5 An equally interesting set of further analytical issues is opened up when interactions between
Aggregation, Time Horizon and Market Structure are considered.
